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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Labor Law-Supervisor-Member Exempt from Union
Discipline for Acting in Furtherance of Employer's
Interest
I. INTRODUCTION
Preservation of internal union solidarity through the exercise of
disciplinary power over members has been recognized as an essential
prerequisite to maintenance of a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis
management.' Therefore, courts have afforded unions relative freedom
to discipline members who violate rules of internal union government.
2
Somewhat different principles of union discipline, however, are applied
to members who occupy supervisory positions with the employer.' The
employee-member is loyal primarily to his union, but the loyalty of the
supervisor-member ultimately is two-dimensional:' he is loyal to the
union by virtue of his union membership and to the employer by virtue
of his supervisory responsibilities. Because the dual loyalties can con-
flict, the NLRA expressly prohibits unions from restraining or coercing
employers in the selection of supervisory representatives. 5 The NLRB
I. See Note, The Right of Unions to Fine Members Who Have Engaged in Strikebreaking
Activities After Resigning From the Union During a Strike, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1272, 1284 (1972).
2. See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
3. Coleman, Union Discipline Under Section 8(b)(l)(A) of the National Labor Relations
Act: The Emergence of a New Trilogy, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 219, 249-51 (1970).
4. This dual loyalty was recognized by Congress and is embodied in the National Labor
Relations Act [hereinafter referred to as NLRA]. First, "supervisor" is defined by § 2(11), 29
U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970) as "any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend
such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment." Section 14(a) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970) provides: "Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual em-
ployed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization .. "
While thus permitting the supervisor to belong to the union, the Act, in § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1970), also excludes the supervisor from the definition of "employee" covered by the Act: "The
term 'employee' . . . shall not include. . . any individual employed as a supervisor .... " The
exclusion of supervisors from the protection of the Act is indicative of a congressional intent to
ensure the employer freedom to hire and fire supervisors of its own choosing. Carpenters Dist.
Council v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 564, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
5. Section 8(b)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(B) (1970) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents-() to restrain or coerce . . .(B) an employer in
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and the courts have extended this protection by proscribing union disci-
pline of a supervisor-member for actions undertaken in the course of his
normal supervisory duties, because the existence of such forms of disci-
pline would constitute indirect interference with the employer's right to
control freely its supervisory representatives.' The supervisor-member
is subject, nevertheless, to discipline for violation of internal union gov-
ernment rules, 7 and the courts have refrained from interfering with
union administration of disciplinary measures in this area.
In two recent decisions the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit extended the scope of the supervisor-member's im-
munity from union discipline. In Meat Cutters Local 81 v. NLRB, the
court held that the supervisor's loyalty to the employer is absolute when
he is discharging his normal responsibilities. Soon thereafter, in IBEW
Local 134 v. NLRB,9 the court reasoned that, on the basis of the empha-
sis in Meat Cutters on the supervisor's paramount loyalty to the em-
ployer, the supervisor-member is immune from union discipline for ac-
tivities that are in furtherance of the employer's interest. This Comment
will focus on the trend toward greater judicial restriction of union disci-
plinary power that is manifested by the instant cases, and on the impli-
cations of this trend for union efforts to maintain internal solidarity
during collective bargaining negotiations.
II. THE ROLE OF UNION DISCIPLINE IN NATIONAL LABOR POLICY
Majority rule in union organization traditionally has been recog-
nized as one of the most important principles of national labor policy,'"
because from a practical standpoint the individual employee's economic
and social status is best improved through collective action. The effec-
tiveness of collective action, however, depends largely on the union's
ability to command the loyalty of all members once the majority has
the selection of its representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of
grievances."
6. See NLRB v. Lithographers Local 15-P, 437 F.2d 55, 57 (6th Cir. 1971); Mailers Local
18, 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,346, 25,347 (1968).
7. Painters Local 453, 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,271 (1970) (union fine of supervisor-
member who failed to comply with union's post strike registration rules upheld). See also Gould,
Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Radia-
tions of Allis-Chalmers, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1067, 1128.
8. 458 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
9. 81 L.R.R.M. 2257 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
10. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180-83 (1967). See generally Gould,
supra note 7, at 1072; Wellington, Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsi-
bility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1333-34 (1958).
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chosen a particular course of action." As a result, the courts and the
NLRB have recognized the validity, and generally have protected the
exercise, of union disciplinary power as a means for ensuring member-
ship adherence to a union position.12 The legal rationale advanced by
the courts to uphold union disciplinary power is popularly known as the
"contract theory" of union membership. 3 This theory provides that by
becoming a member of a union, 4 an employee enters into a contract,
the terms of which are the provisions of the union constitution and by-
laws. Thus, a member's violation of these provisions constitutes a
breach of contract, and union disciplinary action against the offending
member can be enforced judicially as a basic contract law remedy.'
Courts have been particularly willing to enforce disciplinary measures
imposed on members who violate antistrikebreaking rules, because the
union's need for solidarity is most pronounced during a lawful economic
strike."6
Despite the general judicial support of union authority over mem-
bers, the scope of this authority has been the subject of both legislative
I1. A certain degree of individual sacrifice to the will of the majority is required if the full
benefits of collective bargaining are to be realized. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 175, 180 (1967). See also Gould, supra note 7, at 1072; 85 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1672-73
(1972).
12. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 (1967). See also Harrison, Union
Discipline and the Employer-Employee Relationship, 22 LAB. L.J. 216, 219-21 (1971).
13. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181-83 (1967); Booster Lodge No.
405 v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143, 1150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see Silard, Labor Board Regulation of
Union Discipline After Allis-Chalmers, Marine Workers and Scofield, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
187, 190 (1969). The contract theory of union membership, however, has been criticized severely
as an unfounded legal fiction: "The contract of membership is even more of a legal fabrication
than the property rights in membership. . . . In short, membership is a special relationship. It is
as far removed from the main channel of contract law as the relationships created by marriage,
the purchase of a stock certificate, or the hiring of a servant." Summers, Legal Limitations on
Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1055-56 (1951).
14. Under the contract theory membership is held to be the key to the union's authority to
discipline; as under any contract, the employee incurs no contractual obligations and cannot
therefore be disciplined for breach thereof until he actually becomes a member. Booster Lodge No.
405 v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see Christensen, Union Discipline Under
Federal Law: Institutional Dilemmas in an Industrial Democracy, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 227, 269
(1968).
15. For a critical discussion and case study of court application of the contract theory see
Summers, The Lan, of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do In Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 179-84
(1960).
16. The Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers stated that the union's power to discipline mem-
bers for rules violations "is particularly vital when the members engage in strikes. The economic
strike against the employer is the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal for achieving agreement upon
its terms, and '[t]he power to fine or expel strikebreakers is essential if the union is to be an effective
bargaining agent .... .' 388 U.S. at 181 (footnote omitted).
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and judicial controversy. In 1947 Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley
Act, 7 recognizing that union power, if left totally unchecked, could
submerge entirely the individual rights of union members. Conse-
quently, section 8(b)(1)(A) 8 of the Act specifically prohibits union inter-
ference with the basic individual rights guaranteed by section 7 of the
Act. 9 Congress, however, intended the provision to apply only to union
discipline that is coercive in nature and therefore attached a proviso to
section 8(b)(1)(A) that preserves the union's right to exercise lawful
disciplinary power."0 The proviso has been construed by the courts to
mean that unions are to be accorded wide discretion in the use of disci-
plinary powers in relation to matters of strictly "internal union af-
fairs."' 2' The term "internal union affairs" in this context refers to the
relationship between the member and the union, and the exercise of
union discipline-even though inherently coercive in its effect on an
individual member-is legitimate when it affects only that relation-
ship.22 The doctrine was approved expressly by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,23 in which maintenance
of internal solidarity through fines for strikebreaking was found to be a
matter of internal union affairs, and thus was upheld as a valid discipli-
nary action. Moreover, fines levied against members who exceeded a
piecework production ceiling were upheld in Scofield v. NLRB,24 on the
theory that the union has a right to promulgate and enforce internal
rules of conduct to strengthen its bargaining position. 25 The Supreme
Court, however, has recognized that an otherwise valid internal rule
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).
18. Id. § 158(b)(l)(A): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-(l) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
7 .... "
19. Id. § 157 provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities .... "
20. "Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to
prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein ....
Id. § 158(b)(l)(A).
21. See Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 428 (1969); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 175, 185-90 (1967); Silard, supra note 13, at 188.
22. "Some union practices which are inherently coercive under § 8(b)(1)(A) such as fining
or expulsion, are permissible under the proviso if they are within the legitimate interests of the
union and do not contravene any other public policy enunciated in the Act." NLRB v. Molders
Local 125, 442 F.2d 92, 94 (7th Cir. 1971).
23. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
24. 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
25. Id. at 435.
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should not be enforced if it frustrates an overriding national labor pol-
icy, such as free access by employees to the NLRB's procedures for
settlement of grievances. 21 Similarly, the method by which the union
enforces its rules is valid only if it does not adversely affect the rights
of parties other than the union and the employee-member, particularly
the rights of the employer.
2 1
The foregoing principles of union discipline have developed, for the
most part, in the context of the relationship between the union and its
rank-and-file employee-membership. A different problem has arisen,
however, when the relationship at issue is that between the union and
the supervisor-member.Y Section 2(1 1)29 of the NLRA defines "supervi-
sor" as one who has authority to act as the employer's representative
in matters of hiring, discharging, and disciplining other employees.
Since these job responsibilities are closely associated with management
functions, section 2(3)"° excludes supervisors from coverage under the
Act. The Act nevertheless permits supervisors to belong to the union,
31
thus creating a dual personality for supervisors who are union mem-
bers-the supervisor-member apparently is subject to the authority of
the union in the same manner as any rank-and-file member; but con-
gressional recognition of the employer's right to control its supervisory
personne 32 clearly indicates that the supervisor also owes a duty of
loyalty to the employer. The dual loyalties conflict when, in the course
26. NLRB v. Marine Workers Local 22, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968); see Scofield v. NLRB,
394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969); NLRB v. Molders Local 125, 442 F.2d 92, 94 (7th Cir. 1971). See
generally Silard, supra note 13, at 191; Note, Limits of Union Disciplinary Power Under Federal
Law, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 308, 312-14 (1972).
27. The statutory basis for this principle is 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970), which provides:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . (2) to cause or
attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee .... This principle received
early NLRB support. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727, 728-29 (1954). The
Taft-Hartley Act was also intended to protect rights of other parties: "[I]n safeguarding the
regulation of union membership from Labor Board review Congress did not authorize unions to
violate with impunity the protected rights of other parties-particularly of employers, of neutrals,
and the public." Silard, supra note 13, at 196. Some courts have approached this question in terms
of the "external impact" of the disciplinary action. See, e.g., Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423,
432 (1969). See also Christensen, supra note 14, at 271. Eventually this approach was extended by
some courts, which held that discipline is valid if the underlying dispute giving rise to the discipli-
nary action is between the union and the employee, but invalid if the dispute is between the union
and the employer. See NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 49, 430 F.2d 1348, 1350 (10th Cir.
1970); District Council of Carpenters, 177 N.L.R.B. 500, 502 (1969).
28. See note 12 supra.
29. See note 4 supra.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See note 5 supra.
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of performing his s.upervisory duties, the supervisor must decide a ques-
tion on which the union and the employer hold opposing views. Courts
generally have resolved such conflicts in favor of the employer, discern-
ing in the statutory provisions and the legislative history of the Taft-
Hartley Act a congressional intent that the supervisor's loyalty to the
employer should prevail when it conflicts with his union obligations.
3
Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the NLRA34 expressly restricts union power over
supervisors by prohibiting union restraint on coercion of the employer
in the selection of its supervisory personnel for collective bargaining
purposes. This section has been construed to prohibit not only direct
obstruction of the employer's selection right, such as refusal to negotiate
with a particular representative of the employer,35 but indirect interfer-
ence as well. 36 Indirect interference initially took the form of discipli-
nary action against supervisors for specific acts of contract interpreta-
tion or grievance adjustment .3  The rationale behind this view limiting
indirect interference is that, since the supervisor acts as the employer's
representative when performing supervisory duties, he cannot realisti-
cally place the employer's interests above his union obligations38 if the
union can discipline him for interpreting a contract or adjusting a griev-
ance in a manner that displeases the union. Courts have found that this
type of discipline in effect constitutes an attempt by the union to force
the employer to substitute persons subservient to the union's will for
those who represent management's views,39 thus depriving the employer
of the free control of supervisors that section 8(b)(1)(B) was intended
33. See, e.g., District Council of Carpenters, 177 N.L.R.B. 500, 502 (1969). In a 1959
decision the D.C. Circuit said: "Congress was aware of the potential conflict between the obliga-
tions of foremen as representatives of their employers, on the one hand, and as union members,
on the other. Section 2(3) evidences its intent to make the obligations to the employer paramount.
That provision excepts foremen from the protection of the Act. Its purpose was to give the
employer a free hand to discharge foremen as a means of ensuring their undivided loyalty, in spite
of union obligations." Carpenters Dist. Council v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 564, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
34. See note 5 supra.
35. E.g., NLRB v. Teamsters Local 294, 284 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1960).
36. NLRB v. Lithographers Local 15-P, 437 F.2d 55, 57 (6th Cir. 1971). The NLRB stated
in Mailers Local 18, 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,346, 25,347 (1968) "[t]hat [the union]. . .may
have exerted its pressure upon the [employer] by indirect rather than direct means, cannot alter
the ultimate fact that pressure was exerted here for the purpose of interfering with the [employer's]
control over its representatives. . . . In all the circumstances, therefore, we find that [the union's]
acts constitute restraint and coercion of the [employer] in the selection of its representatives within
the meaning of Section 8(b)(l)(B) of the Act."
37. See Mailers Local 143 v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Mailers Local 18, 1968-
2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,346 (1968).
38. See note 33 supra.
39. District Council of Carpenters, 176 N.L.R.B. 797, 798 (1969); Mailers Local 18, 1968-2
CCH NLRB Dec. 25,346 (1968). See also Coleman, supra note 3, at 250.
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to protect. The concept of indirect interference has been extended to
proscribe union fines for supervisory actions other than contract inter-
pretation or grievance adjustment." Courts have reasoned that if the
union may discipline the supervisor for performance of his normal du-
ties, the supervisor will be intimidated by the union in future instances
of contract interpretation or grievance adjustment. 1 Immunity from
union discipline for performing his supervisory duties, however, does not
preclude disciplinary action against a supervisor for violation of valid
union rules of internal government.4 2 Although courts have proscribed
union discipline of a supervisor-member for performing his normal du-
ties even during a strike by the union,43 the question whether a
supervisor-member can be fined for performing rank-and-file work dur-
ing a strike has not yet been resolved.
III. MEAT CUTTERS LOCAL 81 v. NLRB AND IBEW LOCAL 134 v.
NLRB
In Meat Cutters, the employer ordered a manager of a grocery
store meat department to discontinue the customary procedure of order-
ing certain meats in bulk from the warehouse and preparing them at the
retail store, and to begin ordering the meat in prepared form. Despite
union orders to the contrary," the supervisor continued to follow his
employer's instructions and subsequently was fined and expelled by the
union. The court applied the principle of Mailers Local 1811 to these
facts and held that section 8(b)(1)(B) prohibits, as an indirect interfer-
ence with the employer's right to control its supervisory representatives,
union discipline of a supervisor-member for actions indigenous to his
supervisory position. The court went on to discuss and reject two other
union arguments. First, the union asserted that section 14(a),16 which
40. Typographical Local 87, 1970 CCH NLRB Dec. 28,137 (1970) (union fined supervisor
for hiring nonunion members); NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 49, 430 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir.
1970) (union fined foreman for operating crane himself rather than directing employee to do it).
41. Denouncing the union's fines of 2 foremen for performing their normal tasks, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in NLRB v. Lithographers Local 15-P, 437 F.2d 55, 57 (1971) stated:
"This conduct of the union would further operate to make the [supervisory] employees reluctant
in the future to take a position adverse to the union, and their usefulness to their employer would
thereby be impaired."
42. See note 7 supra.
43. E.g., NLRB v. Lithographers Local 15-P, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971); IBEW Local
2150, 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. 30,094 (1971).
44. As a result of this new procedure the work of 7 or 8 union members under the supervi-
sor's control was shifted to the warehouse where it was done by members of another union; hence
the source of Local 81's opposition. 458 F.2d at 797 n.7.
45. 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. 25,346 (1968).
46. See note 4 supra.
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allows supervisors to be union members, manifests a congressional in-
tent to subject the supervisor to full union control. In response to this
contention, the court stated that if section 14(a) is construed in conjunc-
tion with other provisions of the Act, particularly sections 2(3)"7 and
8(b)(1)(B), 48 the sections collectively evidence a legislative design to
make the supervisor-member's loyalty to the employer absolute and
that section 8(b)(1)(B)'s specific purpose is to prevent the union from
undermining this loyalty.49 Secondly, the union contended that its action
was supported by the precedent of Allis-Chalmers and Scofield; the
court, however, distinguished these cases as protecting only legitimate
internal affairs, in which the primary relationship affected was that
between the union and employee-members. Since the underlying dispute
in the instant case was whether the new meat procurement policy vio-
lated the collective bargaining agreement, the court held that the rela-
tionship most affected was that between the union and the employer,
and thus the disciplining of the supervisor was not within the protection
of the "internal union affairs" rule.
50
In IBEW Local 134 several foremen reported to work at the em-
ployer's request"' and performed rank-and-file tasks during a lawful
union strike;52 the foremen subsequently were fined by the union.53 The
court reaffirmed its Meat Cutters holding that the union cannot disci-
pline a supervisor for acts performed in the course of his supervisory
duties, but implicitly acknowledged that Meat Cutters could not control
the instant case, because the fined supervisors had performed rank-and-
file work instead of their normal supervisory tasks. To resolve the issue
the court first examined the legislative history of section 8(b)(1)(B) and
found-as it had in Meat Cutters-that the supervisor owes absolute
allegiance to the employer. Following this finding, the court reasoned
47. Id.
48. See note 5 supra.
49. 458 F.2d at 799-800.
50. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. The union also argued that its action was a
permissible means of preserving bargaining unit work, but the court rejected this argument by
saying that the union could not use internal disciplinary power to force its interpretation of the
contract on the employer. 458 F.2d at 801-02.
51. The employer did not order the foremen to work during the strike; rather it requested
them to do so. It was emphasized to them that no discrimination would ensue whether they worked
or not; some foremen who chose not to work were subsequently promoted. 81 L.R.R.M. at 2258.
52. Some of the foremen who chose to work formed the Bell Supervisors Protective Associa-
tion to protect their interests during the strike. The union subsequently levied separate fines against
the individuals who had been most instrumental in forming the association, but the fines were
invalidated by the instant court. 81 L.R.R.M. at 2258, 2265-67.
53. The union instituted suit in state court to collect some of the fines, but the employer
reimbursed all supervisors who paid any part of the fines. 81 L.R.R.M. at 2259.
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that the language of section 8(b)(1)(B) prohibiting union restraint or
coercion must be given a broad, rather than a narrow, technical reading
to accurately reflect congressional intent. Secondly, the court held that
Allis-Chalmers and Scofield were inapplicable, since they dealt with
discipline of employee-members rather than supervisor-members. The
court concluded that the "legitimate internal affairs" protection that
these cases accorded to union disciplinary power 4 is not available when
the union disciplines a supervisor for actions that "further the em-
ployer's interests," because such discipline adversely affects the
supervisor-employer relationship. The court elaborated on the "further-
ance of the employer's interest" principle, stating that in any dispute
between the employer and the union, a supervisor who places the em-
ployer's interests above those of the union acts as he should reasonably
be expected to act as a representative of management and therefore
should be immune from union discipline. Applying this standard to the
facts of the instant case, the court held that the strengthening of the
employer's bargaining position by lessening the economic impact of the
strike legitimately advanced the employer's best interests. Therefore,
the court concluded that since the foremen were lessening the impact
of the strike by performing rank-and-file struck work, the union's disci-
pline was improper.55 The dissent" strongly criticized the majority's
holding, characterizing it as an unwarranted "major shift in federal
labor policy"57 and a misinterpretation of the legislative history of sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(B). Moreover, according to the dissent, because the major-
ity failed to define adequately the parameters of the doctrine, the "fur-
therance of interest" doctrine conceivably could encompass any action
of supervisor-members, thus freeing them from all union penalty. The
dissent concluded that by allowing supervisors to perform rank-and-file
struck work, the majority in essence had sanctioned a form of strike-
breaking by union members that is contrary to established principles of
national labor policy.
IV. THE CHANGING ROLE OF UNION DISCIPLINE
Immediately following Allis-Chalmers and Scofield the prevailing
54. See notes 23 & 24 supra and accompanying text.
55. The court then invalidated the fines imposed against the supervisors who had formed the
protective association, holding this imposition of fines to be a separate 8(b)(l)(B) violation. See
note 52 supra, The court also affirmed the NLRB's ruling that the International Union violated
§ 8(b)(I)(B) by officially approving the fines, but reversed the NLRB's finding of monetary liabil-
ity. 81 L.R.R.M. at 2268.




judicial attitude toward union disciplinary power was that the union
could exercise almost unlimited control over its members in matters of
internal union affairs. This attitude was particularly evident from con-
tinued court enforcement of fines levied against members for violation
of antistrikebreaking rules. The instant cases, however, signal a signifi-
cant shift in this judicial position. The Meat Cutters decision synthes-
ized Mailers Local 18 with other cases dealing with union discipline of
supervisors to enunciate clearly the proposition that the supervisor, al-
though a union member, owes absolute fealty to the employer in the
performance of his supervisory duties. The decision, however, did not
identify specifically which actions are within the supervisor's normal
course of duties, and thus are beyond the reach of the union's discipli-
nary power. The same court addressed that issue in IBEW Local 134
by articulating the furtherance of interest doctrine,58 which expands the
supervisor's immunity from union discipline to encompass any action
undertaken by the supervisor to further the employer's interest, even if
the action includes performance of rank-and-file struck work. Whether
the enlargement of the supervisor's immunity, as propounded by these
cases, gains acceptance in other circuits and ultimately the Supreme
Court will depend largely on first, the viability of the "furtherance of
interest doctrine" as the conceptual standard governing the relationship
of the union and supervisor, and secondly, on the persuasiveness of the
rationale employed by the court in the instant cases.
Although the court stated explicitly that the supervisor-member is
not immune totally from union discipline," these decisions in fact may
preclude meaningful union discipline of supervisors in the future. If the
supervisor is protected from union discipline for acts done in further-
ance of the employer's interests, it is difficult to imagine a supervisor's
action that would subject him to union discipline under this test, except
for infractions of minor union rules, such as membership registration.
Neither Meat Cutters nor IBEW Local 134 indicate what conceptual
limitations, if any, should be placed on this doctrine. Per se protection
of supervisors is unwarranted, however, because the supervisor is ac-
58. The furtherance of interest test is not actually a new creation of the IBEW Local 134
decision. It was implied in an earlier NLRB decision in which fines imposed on supervisors for
doing tasks directed by the employer during a strike were held to violate § 8(b)(1)(B): "Here, the
supervisors, by doing struck work, as directed by the Employer, were furthering the interests of
the Employer in a dispute not between the Union and the supervisor-members but between the
Employer and the Union." IBEW Local 2150, 1971 CCH NLRB Dec. 30,094, 30,096 (1971).
Neither that case, nor any other case, however, propounded this test as a doctrine in the manner
of the instant case.
59. 81 L.R.R.M. at 2262 n.28.
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corded an unusually favored position vis-a-vis the union. The supervisor
receives the benefits of union membership, particularly retention of his
withdrawal card,6" but unlike the employee-member, apparently is free
from union obligations beyond payment of dues. This result is a depar-
ture from the traditional labor principle that the obligations imposed by
union rules are part of the price expected of the individual for the
benefits derived from union membership.6" Secondly, although the court
correctly stated that the employer has the right to control its supervisory
employees and that the union should be prohibited from disciplining
supervisor-members for performing their normal supervisory duties dur-
ing a lawful strike, to allow the supervisor to perform rank-and-file
struck work appears to lend judicial sanction to a form of strikebreak-
ing heretofore not permitted under the NLRA. Lastly, the instant deci-
sions will tend to impair the effectiveness of the union's ultimate weapon
in the collective bargaining process-the strike. 2 Because the daily im-
pact of a strike will be decreased by performance of rank-and-file work
by supervisors, strikes necessarily will have to be lengthened to subject
the employer to the same economic effect. As a strike continues, the
enthusiasm of rank-and-file employee-members to remain on strike nat-
urally tends to wane, thus limiting further the union's ability to maintain
internal solidarity.
The court's reasoning in the instant cases is not persuasive for two
reasons. First, in each case, the court relied substantially on an interpre-
tation of the legislative history of section 8(b)(1) that stressed a congres-
sional intent to make the supervisor-member's loyalty to his employer
absolute and unconditional, despite any obligations imposed upon him
by his union membership. The court in IBEW Local 134 even perceived
a congressional intent to extend the coverage of section 8(b)(1)(B) to
performance by supervisors of rank-and-file struck work. 3 The dissent-
ing opinion in that case, however, interpreted the same history to have
a meaning virtually the opposite of the interpretation proffered by the
majority. 4 Moreover, commentators do not agree on the true intent of
Congress in passing the section. 5 The disagreement is attributable pri-
60. This card greatly facilitates the union member's obtaining another job in the same trade
if he transfers out of the jurisdiction of his local.
61. See note II supra and accompanying text.
62. See note 16 supra.
63. 81 L.R.R.M. at 2266.
64. Id. at 2271, n. I.
65. See, e.g., Christensen, supra note 14, at 271; Silard, supra note 13, at 188. Professor
Harrison appraised the reasons for different judicial interpretations of congressional intent with a
candid statement, applicable to legal scholars as well as jurists: "The legislative history of these
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marily to the lack of an extensive, identifiable legislative history for the
provision. Section 8(b)(1) was not included in the Taft-Hartley bill when
it was reported out of committee; rather it was added as an amendment
from the Senate floor. Consequently, no committee reports or testimony
exists which set forth the major policy considerations that prompted the
drafting of the section. The only legislative history available is the tran-
script of the Senate floor debates that were held on the amendment upon
its presentation.6 Because of the apparent dearth of positive indicia of
the true congressional intent, the court's extensive reliance on the legis-
lative history of section 8(b)(1) tends to detract from the persuasiveness
of its position. Secondly, the court in both decisions distinguished Allis-
Chalmers and Scofield almost summarily by holding that Allis-
Chalmers' enforcement of union fines against members who violate
antistrikebreaking rules did not apply to the fining of supervisors. Find-
ing that the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers relied on section
8(b)(1)(A)'s proviso, which preserved the union's power to enforce inter-
nal rules, the instant court stated that the proviso was enacted to limit
only the protection accorded by section 8(b)(1)(A) to employees in the
exercise of their section 7 rights and thus did not affect the immunity
of supervisors provided by section 8(b)(1)(B). Most commentators
agree, however, that the Allis-Chalmers holding was based primarily on
the Supreme Court's finding that such fines do not "restrain or coerce"
the employees' exercise of their section 7 rights;67 because the term
"restrain or coerce" appears in the body of section 8(b)(1) and is there-
fore applicable to subsection (B) as well as to subsection (A), the court's
dismissal of the reasoning of Allis-Chalmers probably is not supporta-
ble. In addition, the instant court rejected Allis-Chalmers and Scofield
because different relationships were affected by the union actions. The
court reasoned that since Allis-Chalmers and Scofield focused on fines
of employee-members only, the relationship affected was that between
the union and its rank-and-file members, a subject properly within "in-
ternal union affairs."6 The court found that that rule is not available
to the union when supervisor-members are fined, because the underlying
sections has left much to be desired in terms of the specific intent of Congress. In fact, the different
opinions of judges and NLRB members . . . were often made on the basis of selective reliance on
the legislative history of these sections." Harrison, supra note 12, at 217.
66. The Senate-House conference committee reports offer no help, because the Senate
amendment was adopted without change. See Comment, 8(b)(l (A) Limitations Upon the Right
of a Union to Fine its Members, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 47, 52 (1966).
67. The discussion of the section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso was only of secondary importance to
the decision. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 7, at 1128; Silard, supra note 13, at 190.
68. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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dispute is that between the union and the employer. The discipline would
affect primarily the union-employer relationship 9 and this, according to
the court, would be outside the scope of internal union affairs. Since any
lawful strike results from a dispute between the union and the employer,
and union discipline of members for strike-related activities would seem
to affect the union-employer relationship whether the members were
rank-and-file employees or supervisors, the instant court's reasoning is
not compelling.
Although not discussed in the instant cases, a legitimate basis for
different treatment of discipline for employee-members and supervisor-
members is suggested by the dicta in Allis-Chalmers. The Court in that
decision distinguished between the "full union member," who partici-
pates fully in all union benefits and the "less-than-full member," whose
only real connection to the union is his payment of initiation fees and
periodic dues.70 Because the full member in effect has pledged his alle-
giance to the union, he is properly subject to the full panoply of union
rules and discipline for any violation thereof. On the other hand, one
who only is associated with the "financial core" of membership does not
participate in all benefits of union membership and should be exempt
from union discipline, except for nonpayment of dues.71 Therefore, if
supervisor-members are classified as less-than-full members, there is a
valid basis for the trend manifested by the instant cases to exempt
supervisors from union discipline. If, however, the supervisor-member
is allowed to participate freely in all union activities and to receive all
the benefits of union membership," it is difficult to justify disciplinary
treatment that differs from that permissible for a full member.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite its relative position of favor and seeming stability following
Allis-Chalmers and Scofield, union disciplinary power over members
has been subjected to significant restriction by the instant cases in their
application to supervisor-members. No longer is the supervisor's im-
munity from union discipline confined to actions performed to discharge
69. See note 27 supra.
70. 388 U.S. at 196-97.
71. See Note, Labor Policy: Judicial Enforcement of Fines After Allis-Chalmers, 53
CORNELL L. REv. 1094, 1096 (1968).
72. Professor Gould expressed opposition to exemption of supervisor-members from disci-
pline for violation of antistrikebreaking rules, but this opposition proceeds from his assumption
that supervisors participate fully in union benefits. If a supervisor did not, however, participate in
union activites beyond mere financial support, Professor Gould might agree with the holding in
IBEW Local 134. See Gould, supra note 7, at 1129.
19731
